GMO Flatt Security Research
October 3, 2025

CVE-2025-59489: Arbitrary Code Execution in Unity Runtime

Posted on October 3, 2025  •  6 minutes  • 1067 words
Table of contents

Introduction

Hello, I’m RyotaK (@ryotkak ), a security engineer at GMO Flatt Security Inc.

In May 2025, I participated in the Meta Bug Bounty Researcher Conference 2025. During this event, I discovered a vulnerability (CVE-2025-59489) in the Unity Runtime that affects games and applications built on Unity 2017.1 and later.

In this article, I will explain the technical aspects of this vulnerability and its impact.

This vulnerability was disclosed to Unity following responsible disclosure practices.
Unity has since released patches for Unity 2019.1 and later, as well as a Unity Binary Patch tool to address the issue, and I strongly encourage developers to download the updated versions of Unity, recompile affected games or applications, and republish as soon as possible.

For the official security advisory, please refer to Unity’s advisory here: https://unity.com/security/sept-2025-01

We appreciate Unity’s commitment to addressing this issue promptly and their ongoing efforts to enhance the security of their platform.
Security vulnerabilities are an inherent challenge in software development, and by working together as a community, we can continue to make software systems safer for everyone.

TL;DR

A vulnerability was identified in the Unity Runtime’s intent handling process for Unity games and applications.
This vulnerability allows malicious intents to control command line arguments passed to Unity applications, enabling attackers to load arbitrary shared libraries (.so files) and execute malicious code, depending on the platform.

In its default configuration, this vulnerability allowed malicious applications installed on the same device to hijack permissions granted to Unity applications.
In specific cases, the vulnerability could be exploited remotely to execute arbitrary code, although I didn’t investigate third-party Unity applications to find an app with the functionality required to enable this exploit.

Unity has addressed this issue and has updated all affected Unity versions starting with 2019.1. Developers are strongly encouraged to download them, recompile their games and applications, and republish to ensure their projects remain secure.

About Unity

Unity is a popular game engine used to develop games and applications for various platforms, including Android.

According to Unity’s website, 70% of top mobile games are built with Unity. This includes popular games like Among Us and Pokémon GO, along with many other applications that use Unity for development.

Technical Details

Note: During the analysis, I used Android 16.0 on the Android Emulator of Android Studio. The behavior and impact of this vulnerability may differ on older Android versions.

Unity’s Intent Handler

To support debugging Unity applications on Android devices, Unity automatically adds a handler for the intent containing the unity extra to the UnityPlayerActivity. This activity serves as the default entry point for applications and is exported to other applications.

https://docs.unity3d.com/6000.0/Documentation/Manual/android-custom-activity-command-line.html 

adb shell am start -n "com.Company.MyGame/com.unity3d.player.UnityPlayerActivity" -e unity "-systemallocator"

As documented above, the unity extra is parsed as command line arguments for Unity.

While Android’s permission model manages feature access by granting permissions to applications, it does not restrict which intents can be sent to an application.
This means any application can send the unity extra to a Unity application, allowing attackers to control the command line arguments passed to that application.

xrsdk-pre-init-library Command Line Argument

After loading the Unity Runtime binary into Ghidra, I discovered the following command line argument:

initLibPath = FUN_00272540(uVar5, "xrsdk-pre-init-library");

The value of this command line argument is later passed to dlopen, causing the path specified in xrsdk-pre-init-library to be loaded as a native library.

lVar2 = dlopen(initLibPath, 2);

This behavior allows attackers to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Unity application, leveraging its permissions by launching them with the -xrsdk-pre-init-library argument.

Attack Scenarios

Local Attack

Any malicious application installed on the same device can exploit this vulnerability by:

  1. Extracting the native library with the android:extractNativeLibs attribute set to true in the AndroidManifest.xml
  2. Launching the Unity application with the -xrsdk-pre-init-library argument pointing to the malicious library
  3. The Unity application would then load and execute the malicious code with its own permissions

Remote Exploitation via Browser

In specific cases, this vulnerability could potentially be exploited remotely although the condition .
For example, if an application exports UnityPlayerActivity or UnityPlayerGameActivity with the android.intent.category.BROWSABLE category (allowing browser launches), websites can specify extras passed to the activity using intent URLs:

intent:#Intent;package=com.example.unitygame;scheme=custom-scheme;S.unity=-xrsdk-pre-init-library%20/data/local/tmp/malicious.so;end;

At first glance, it might appear that malicious websites could exploit this vulnerability by forcing browsers to download .so files and load them via the xrsdk-pre-init-library argument.

SELinux Restrictions

However, Android’s strict SELinux policy prevents dlopen from opening files in the downloads directory, which mitigates almost all remote exploitation scenarios.

library "/sdcard/Download/libtest.so" ("/storage/emulated/0/Download/libtest.so") needed 
or dlopened by "/data/app/~~24UwD8jnw7asNjRwx1MOBg==/com.DefaultCompany.com.unity.template. 
mobile2D-E043IptGJDwcTqq56BocIA==/lib/arm64/libunity.so" is not accessible for the 
namespace: [name="clns-9", ld_library_paths="",default_library_paths="/data/app/~~24UwD8jnw7asNjRwx1MOBg==/com.DefaultCompany.com.unity.template. 
mobile2D-E043IptGJDwcTqq56BocIA==/lib/arm64:/data/app/~~24UwD8jnw7asNjRwx1MOBg==/com.DefaultCompany.com.unity.template.mobile2D-E043IptGJDwcTqq56BocIA==/base.apk!/lib/arm64-v8a", permitted_paths="/data:/mnt/expand:/data/data/com.DefaultCompany.com.unity.template.mobile2D"]

That being said, since the /data/ directory is included in permitted_paths, if the target application writes files to its private storage, it can be used to bypass this restriction.

Furthermore, dlopen doesn’t require the .so file extension. If attackers can control the content of a file in an application’s private storage, they can exploit this vulnerability by creating a file containing malicious native library binary. This is actually a common pattern when applications cache data.

For example, another vulnerability in Messenger was exploited using the application’s cache: https://www.hexacon.fr/slides/Calvanno-Defense_through_Offense_Building_a_1-click_Exploit_Targeting_Messenger_for_Android.pdf

Requirements for Remote Exploitation

To exploit this vulnerability remotely, the following conditions must be met:

Even without these conditions, local exploitation remains possible for any Unity application.

Demonstration

Conclusion

In this article, I explained a vulnerability in Unity Runtime that allows arbitrary code execution in almost all Unity applications on Android.

I hope this article helps you understand that vulnerabilities can exist in the frameworks and libraries you depend on, and you should always be mindful of the security implications of the features you use.

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